Agosto 30, 2007   

Moral hazard and bending the rules


Juan Toro

In the recent stockmarket turmoil and interventions by Central Banks two important information problems were at play. One was the adverse selection issue as many banks tried to outguess the balance sheets of their partners. This halted borrowing among them and the appearance of a risk premium in money markets. The second issue was the moral hazard problem that could rise if Central Banks bailed out some financial institutions by cutting rates, setting the precedent that banking malpractice will always find the safe net of a lenient Central Banks. This second issue has been much disputed and many economists have maintained the blunt positions that “Central Banks should not rescue fools”(see http://blogs.ft.com/wolfforum/2007/08/central-banks-s.html).

Despite the strong arguments against the rescue of some banks that had taken bad loans on their balance sheet, it seems that the Fed has gone some way in this direction. This week, the Fed has agreed to bend key banking regulations, making some exceptions in favour of Bank of America and Citigroup. The Fed has agreed to exempt both banks from rules that limit the amount of lending that these institutions can do to their brokerage affiliates. The purpose of these exceptions is to provide temporary funding to some of their subsidiary holding mortgage loans, mortgage back securities and similar assets. These same two banks recently made use of the discount window in order to alleviate some liquidity stress. Both facts might be linked together and reflect the way the Fed wants liquidity to extend quickly and smoothly to those parts of the banking sector most needed. However, these exemptions might create moral hazard issues in subsequent times. Banks might believe that further exemptions will be offered in the future and that Central Banks will always bail out them no matter how stupidly they behave.


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Posted on 30 Agosto 2007 in Financial Markets

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